UEFI variables — QEMU documentation

# UEFI variables

## Guest UEFI variable management

The traditional approach for UEFI Variable storage in qemu guests is to work as close as possible to physical hardware. That means providing pflash as storage and leaving the management of variables and flash to the guest.

Secure boot support comes with the requirement that the UEFI variable storage must be protected against direct access by the OS. All update requests must pass the sanity checks. (Parts of) the firmware must run with a higher privilege level than the OS so this can be enforced by the firmware. On x86 this has been implemented using System Management Mode (SMM) in qemu and kvm, which again is the same approach taken by physical hardware. Only privileged code running in SMM mode is allowed to access flash storage.

Communication with the firmware code running in SMM mode works by serializing the requests to a shared buffer, then trapping into SMM mode via SMI. The SMM code processes the request, stores the reply in the same buffer and returns.

## Host UEFI variable service

Instead of running the privileged code inside the guest we can run it on the host. The serialization protocol can be reused. The communication with the host uses a virtual device, which essentially configures the shared buffer location and size, and traps to the host to process the requests.

The `uefi-vars` device implements the UEFI virtual device. It comes in `uefi-vars-x86` and `uefi-vars-sysbus` flavours. The device reimplements the handlers needed, specifically `EfiSmmVariableProtocol` and `VarCheckPolicyLibMmiHandler`. It also consumes events (`EfiEndOfDxeEventGroup`, `EfiEventReadyToBoot` and `EfiEventExitBootServices`).

The advantage of the approach is that we do not need a special privilege level for the firmware to protect itself, i.e. it does not depend on SMM emulation on x64, which allows the removal of a bunch of complex code for SMM emulation from the linux kernel (CONFIG_KVM_SMM=n). It also allows support for secure boot on arm without implementing secure world (el3) emulation in kvm.

Of course there are also downsides. The added device increases the attack surface of the host, and we are adding some code duplication because we have to reimplement some edk2 functionality in qemu.

### usage on x86_64

    qemu-system-x86_64 \
       -device uefi-vars-x86,jsonfile=/path/to/vars.json

### usage on aarch64

    qemu-system-aarch64 -M virt \
       -device uefi-vars-sysbus,jsonfile=/path/to/vars.json